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EEC LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PANEL DISCUSSION
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question for Professor Korah
regarding the grant of territorial licenses. It is quite common, for
example, in the recording industry for a sound recording copyright
holder to grant a license for a particular territory to a record com-
pany in that territory to manufacture records and sell them only in
that territory. Are you saying that if that licensee under the license
then begins to sell outside the territory and the licensor then sues
the licensee for going beyond the scope of the license, that that
limited territory would likely violate Article 85(1)?
PROFESSOR KORAH: The Commission did take that view in
the informal decision in GEMA.' A license to press disks in one
Member State was treated as a license to do so throughout the
Common Market, subject to a ban on making in and exporting to
other Member States, which infringed Article 85(1) and was, there-
fore, void. If a purchaser from you had promised not to sell the
disk, then I think it would be clear that any restriction on his or her
exporting would be caught by 85(1), and you couldn't rely on your
copyright in the country of import to keep it out.
The Coditel judgments2 have already been discussed today, and
I don't know quite how far they go. Both judgments involved the
performing rights in a film. The Community Court looked to the
practice of the industry and the way that distributors pay for film
production. In Coditel I the Court held that the specific subject
matter of the performing rights was such that the rules for free
movement of services did not prevent the exclusive copyright li-
censee in Belgium from suing on the copyright to prevent Coditel,
a cable television company in Belgium, from picking up and
rediffusing the transmission from Germany, a territory licensed to
another firm.
The Coditel cases go to the edge of the law. I would be con-
cerned about extending them beyond films. The exercise of copy-
1. Press Release IP(85), Feb. 6, 1985, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, Bull. E.C. 2-1985, p. 29.
2. S.A. Compagnie Gdndral pour la Diffusion de la T6l6vision v. Cin6 Vog Films,
Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362; Coditel S.A. v. Cin6-Vog Films
S.A., Case 262/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49.
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right would ensure absolute territorial protection but has been al-
lowed only in connection with performing rights. In Warner Bros.
v. Christiansen,3 however, the Court extended the judgments in
Coditel to rental rights in a disk. So it is arguable that it might be
prepared to extend them further to a license to make and sell.
There is one other case, and that is the Maize Seed case.4 Un-
der the treaties relating to plant breeders' rights, you lose your
rights unless the seed is distinct, uniform, and stable. In those cir-
cumstances, the Court again allowed export bans because of the
need to ensure careful handling.
Your case is between Coditel and Centrafarm v. Sterling,5 and
I would hate to guess. My impression is that the Court is becom-
ing more receptive to the need to encourage investment and to look
into the practices of the trade. So my answer to you today would
be more positive than it would have been in 1976 or so, but it's not
that positive.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Korah, could you look into
your crystal ball and tell us the direction you see the Court taking
in the Magill area?
PROFESSOR KORAH: I cannot understand the judgment of
the Court of First Instance. Mr. Myrick's paper is excellent. I
really have very little to add to what he said there.
It seems to me that if the Court of First Instance wanted to con-
firm the Commission's decision that the exercise of copyright was
abusive the best reasoning would have been that, although it's for
national law to decide the scope of copyright, there are limits. In
trademark cases, there are some indications of limits. The Court
itself, in Terranova,6 an old case, suggested that the very broad
3. Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 684.
4. Erauw-Jacqufry Sprl v. La Hesbignonne Soci6td Coopdrative, Case 27/87, [1988]
E.C.R. 1919, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576.
5. Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480.
6. Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Tenranova Industrie C.A. Kapfere & Co., Case 119/75,
[1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482.
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ideas of confusion under German law might be going too far. But
I suspect that it was a compromise passage. It's not very clear
what the Court was saying. Much more clearly, the Advocate-
General, Francis Jacobs, in the second Hag7 case, said that the
German ideas of confusion of trademarks might be going too far.
I think that if I had drafted the judgment and wanted to uphold
the decision in Magill, I would have taken that route. The Court
has never said that all exercise of intellectual property rights is
subject to Article 86. That seems utterly inconsistent-well, almost
utterly inconsistent-with Volvo8 and Renault.9 I certainly hope
that the Court changes the grounds of their judgment; otherwise it's
terrifying.
DR. VERSTRYNGE: I want to add something on Magill. I
think the Court very well could have avoided the problem if they
had stuck to strict copyright interpretation, saying that the essence
of copyright covers the prevention of the expression, not the under-
lying ideas; and that, therefore, the listing of television programs
has no expression, no originality, is not protected by copyright-in
essence leaving the whole terrain of the Magill case to Article 86.
That would have been very correct both from the copyright and the
antitrust points of view.
PROFESSOR KORAH: The only trouble with that is it will be
a Community idea of copyright. I think that an Irish court and an
English court-not the highest courts-have held that publication
of the guide was an infringement of copyright. So your solution
would override national law. I think we are in agreement.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Korah, did I understand you
to say that you think that the Commission could change its ap-
proach to know-how licensing in 1994 and that it would become
less restrictive or more enforceable?
PROFESSOR KORAH: No. I don't remember what I said, but
7. SA CNL Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571.
8. Volvo AB v. Erik Veng UK Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 122.
9. Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per Aiutoveicoli v. Regie
Nationale des Usines Renlault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265.
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what I think is that the Know-how Regulation'0 is much more liber-
al than that for patent licenses. Mr. Guttuso has, of course, a hier-
archy to report to; but, nevertheless, he has very liberal ideas and
he got quite a lot of them through the Know-how Regulation. He
now is in charge of doing something about the expiring Patent
Regulation."
What he was minded to do last January when I saw him was
that he would let the Patent Regulation expire and alter the defini-
tions in the Know-how Regulation so that it includes pure patent
licenses. There would also have to be some transitional provisions,
but not many. I think most people will be very happy with that.
There are about two or three things that you can do under the
Patent Regulation that you cannot do under the Know-how Regula-
tion. Under the Patent Regulation, the periods for territorial protec-
tion can extend beyond these originally allowed if improvements
are added to the license; that's not possible under the Know-how
Regulation. Although if there is further substantial, secret, and
recorded know-how, a further license may be negotiated with addi-
tional periods of territorial protection. Even under the Patent Regu-
lation, you've got to give each party an annual chance to renegoti-
ate. But over all, you nearly always have more choice when using
the Know-how Regulation.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: At the time the Software Directive 12
was being discussed, a question was raised about whether the pro-
vision which limits the rights of parties to contract regarding the
reproduction right13 was consistent with the EC law and whether it
would stand the test of a court case. Is it consistent with EC law?
PROFESSOR KORAH: If you were litigating under the law of
10. Commission Regulation No. 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agreements,
O.J. L 61/1 (1989).
11. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, O.J. L
219/15 (1989).
12. Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 91/250/EEC, O.J. L 122/42 (1991).
13. id. art. 5.
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a Member State, the Directive would be part of the public policy
of that Member State. I believe a national court within the Com-
munity would have to follow the Software Directive. Moreover,
when the EEA comes into force, that would be part of the Acquis
Communautaire, and so it would apply much more broadly than in
the twelve. If you were suing in America, I think that's a question
I should push back to you.
PROFESSOR GOEBEL: I think what you're raising is not so
much whether the Court would in any way challenge the clause of
the Software Directive now, but whether it was appropriate to put
it into the Directive in the first place.
It goes back to my comments about what the harmonization
program is all about. It supposedly is to be conducted, under Arti-
cle 100a, to remove barriers to the internal market, and, in particu-
lar, to the free movement of goods and services. It occasionally
might be supplemented by Article 235, the implied powers clause,
but, generally speaking, the Commission and the Council haven't
felt that that was necessary. Nonetheless, a certain amount of what
has been proposed and adopted as legislation, and is being pro-
posed, goes a bit beyond that. It incorporates what I call socio-
cultural ideas.
I think it's quite clear in the Rental Directive,1 4 where one of
the recitals refers to the economic interests of authors that are go-
ing to be promoted by the Rental Directive, and the recovery of
investments and so on. It goes quite beyond the simple removal of
barriers to goods.
The contrary view, which has been advocated certainly by the
common law lawyers, is that you don't really need to adopt some
of these points of view in order to remove the barriers to trade.
Private contractual arrangements can do this just as well; leave the
private sector to decide. That comes up in this whole issue about
droit moral also, as well as in rental rights and in the Software Di-
rective.
14. Council Directive of 19 November 1992 on Rental Right and Lending Right and
on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 92/100/EEC,
O.J. L 346/61 (1992).
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The practical state of affairs, though, is that most of the conti-
nental countries have a different approach. They'd much rather
abide by statutory method; and hence, they are, I think, from a
political point of view, more inclined to go along with the idea that
this is appropriate to add to these directives, that you should not
only simply remove the barriers to trade, but you should also look
to a broader social and cultural horizon.
The Maastricht Treaty15 might have reinforced that view to
some degree because it does add cultural measures as an appro-
priate area of Treaty concern in Article 128. On the other hand, it
also introduces subsidiarity. The last line of the subsidiarity sec-
tion of Article 3B of the Maastricht Treaty refers to proportionality;
any legislation must be reasonably designed to achieve the ends at-
tained. You will have in the Maastricht Treaty two arguments that
go in different directions on whether or not the type of clause
you're referring to is appropriate. Whether the court would ever
strike down such a clause is, however, highly doubtful. I would
agree with that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Professor Korah, assume that a com-
pany that is exporting technology to an EC Member State that does
not rise to the level of patent protection but would come within the
American concept of trade secret, normally exports some sort of
proprietary information along with the technology that cannot be
disclosed without the consent of the exporting company. Would
that violate Article 85(1)?
PROFESSOR KORAH: No. I think that's about the one bit of
comfort I can give you. The Commission, from the beginning, has
accepted that secrecy of secret know-how is not contrary to Article
85(1). There are provisions in the "white list" of the Know-
how-and, indeed, of the Patent-Regulation. One has to read the
white list of provisions in the light of the recitals. The recital says
that the clauses in Article 2 very rarely infringe Article 85(1), but
they are exempted just in case they are caught.
15. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
719.
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So, even if you have something like a software license which
can't be brought within the Regulation, one can argue from the
recitals to the Regulation that the secrecy of the software is invio-
late, or at least the provisions in the contract that protect it, or the
provisions in equity that protect it, are not contrary to 85(1).
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There has been a lot of Magill-bash-
ing both in the press and during the seminar, but it seems to be
distinguishingly animated by some of the harmonization directives
such as the Software Directive. Is that a fair reading?
DR. VERSTRYNGE: The Magill case is a complicated case,
and it is difficult to talk about it because we don't know what the
result will be. The Magill case is an antitrust case, not an intellec-
tual property case. The main focus of the Commission was Article
86, and I think that under Article 86 the position of the Commis-
sion was correct; and I think will now be approved by the Court of
Justice even if there isn't an agreement with the full Court. I think
that under Article 86 the result is correct.
The dispute seems to originate from the reasoning which the
Court of First Instance used to reach that result. It is clear that the
boundary between the approach in the first clause is a boundary
which is not exactly delineated in the actual case. We have the
impression-and I would agree with Dr. Korah on this-that in the
design case the Court said that exclusive licensing was part of the
essence of the right. Whereas in the Magill case there were some
valid concerns that intellectual property could keep a downstream
competitor from competing.
It is clear that you are right in pointing out that the way the
Court interprets copyright in Magill will have impact-might have
impact--on things such as the exact way we delimited the protec-
tion in software, or indeed, in the design of other rights across the
board because it will come from the avenue of Article 86 not from
the avenue of intellectual property.
It's an important case and an important decision. I will say no
more because it is not decided yet. But it's fair to read that it has
potential influence on many issues on the Software, the Database,
and other Directives.
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